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Camille Boullenois
1 Drawing  upon  the scholarship  on
“decentralised authoritarianism” (Landry
2008),  this  collection  conducts  a
comparative  study  of  how  central-local
government  relations  in  contemporary
China  are  configured  and  shape  policy-
making in several domains. Mainly based
on  abundant  secondary  sources  and
official  statistics,  it  offers  an  excellent
synthesis of the balance of power between
different  levels  of  government  on issues
ranging  from  investment  control  to
government  finance  and  taxation,
regional  policy,  culture  protection  and
promotion, policy implementation, social
welfare, and even foreign policy. Overall,
the  book  offers  a  fascinating  account  of
the  process  of  decentralisation  and  re-
centralisation  that  has  occurred  since
1978  in  China,  with  a  focus  on  shared
interests and complementarity more than
on conflict and opposition. 
2 After an introduction detailing China’s administrative hierarchies and their evolution
over time, chapters 2 and 3 focus on province/centre relations in the finance sector.
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Philip Hsu (Chapter 2) challenges the idea that provinces overpowered the centre in the
early days of the reform period, and that the centre regained power over provinces
after the tax-sharing system was imposed. Both periods, he argues, are characterised by
shared interests and compromises. Yukyung Yeo (Chapter 3) shows that both central
and provincial governments retain a strong influence over investment control within
the tax-sharing system, although through different means. Local governments mainly
use administrative supervision, he argues, whereas the central government relies on
political control. Overall, both influences are complementary, rather than conflictual.
3 Chapter 4 underlines the complementarity of central and provincial governments in
regional policies. The increasing influence of regional governance as a driver of growth
and urbanisation reinforced both central and provincial roles, Long Yang argues. His
idea  that  increased  cross-district  cooperation  may,  with  time,  create  quasi-
administrative  hierarchies  in  areas  such as  the  Jing–Jin–Ji  region (covering Beijing,
Tianjin, and Hebei) is very stimulating, yet one regrets the absence of in-depth study on
competition between provinces and its consequences on regional inequalities in China.
4 Chapter  5,  perhaps  the  most  stimulating,  seeks  to  analyse  the  complex  interaction
between  administrative  hierarchy  and  urbanisation.  John  Donaldson  contends  that
urban  levels  of  government  (municipalities  and  prefectures)  were  the  immediate
winners of decentralisation during the Jiang era. He then underlines the dramatic shift
towards  re-centralisation  and administrative  urbanisation  slow-down under  the  Hu
administration. In contrast with the usual stance on Hu’s failure to implement his “new
socialist  countryside”  program,  Donaldson  contends  that  Hu’s  administration
effectively slowed down the process of “turning counties into urban districts,” giving
more  power  to  provinces  over  municipalities  and  prefectures.  This  slow-down,
however, was short-lived, Donaldson argues, as Xi Jinping has resumed and hastened
China’s efforts at urbanisation.
5 In Chapter 6, Chung Jae Ho argues that the degree of local discretion in implementing
central  policy  mainly  depends  on  policy  scope  (selective  or  encompassing),  policy
nature  (involving  resources  or  governance  issues),  and  level  of  urgency.  Chung
rightfully  shows  that  the  centre  is  still  largely  capable  of  using  institutional  tools,
personnel control, and local surveillance to rein in localities on issues it prioritises. But
the  chapter  fails  to  explain  the  complex  dynamic  of  contention,  negotiation,  and
noncompliance on the part of local implementers. An analysis of the cadre evaluation
system  and  the  Central  Disciplinary  Inspection  Committee’s  role  would  have  been
useful here.
6 Chapter 7 presents an original perspective on central-local  relations in the cultural
realm. Studying the case of China’s urban cultural heritage, Tse-Kang Leng argues that
the  contradictory  goals  of  central  and  local  governments  have  created  a  multi-
stakeholder dynamic not only among those governments, but also among key members
of China’s society, resulting in unresolved tensions between exploiting or preserving
China’s endangered heritage.
7 In Chapter 8,  Xufeng Zhu offers an interesting argument on China’s evolving social
welfare policy, showing that local officials have been encouraged to focus on economic
growth and development, and have thus largely ignored calls to establish a costly social
welfare regime in the first phase of post-1978 development. In a second period starting
with Hu’s presidency, the central state sought re-centralisation, allowing for ambitious
social welfare reforms, but also leading to major imbalances. 
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8 Finally, in Chapter 9 Professor Li Mingjiang focuses on central/local relations in foreign
policy, showing the rising participation of local actors. This participation, he argues,
both  complements  and  is  subject  to  the  central  agenda.  While  this  focus  on
complementarity is relevant and opens important avenues for research, one wonders
to  what  extent,  and  how,  Chinese  provinces  can  indirectly  oppose  the  central
government and impose their own agenda. 
9 Overall, the authors offer an excellent account of central-local relations in a historical
perspective,  showing  that  the  decentralisation  in  the  1980s  was  based  on  mutual
interests as central and local governments both focused on economic growth, while the
re-centralisation process in the 1990s resulted from a compromise between local and
central governments, whose interests started drifting apart. The focus on compromise
and shared interests is stimulating and convincing.
10 However, despite its significant contributions, the book has two main weaknesses. First,
beyond specific  examples (mainly in Chapter 5),  there is  no attempt to analytically
differentiate  between  different  levels  of  “local  government,”  in  particular  between
provinces  and  lower  levels.  Provincial  governors  and  mayors  of  major  cities  enjoy
enormous autonomy in policy-making,1 and given their strong interpersonal ties with
central elites, they are also successful lobbyists for local interests. By contrast, at the
prefecture or county level, what worries the central government most is not so much
negotiation and overt  opposition,  but  rather  simple  non-implementation of  central
policies2.  The book could have fruitfully deepened its analysis of the different tools
used by the central government to control provinces and sub-level officials, as well as
the changing balance of power between various levels of government. 
11 A second weakness (although somewhat inevitable given that the book was published
only a few years into Xi’s presidency) is that the book fails to analyse the major shifts
brought about by the Xi administration. Xi’s presidency has been extremely concerned
with  policy  implementation,  seeking  to  reinforce  the  Party’s  Leninist  organisation,
launching  top-down  anti-corruption  campaigns,  and  reinvigorating  sanctions
mechanisms for local cadres. Tightening party discipline is likely to have unexpected
outcomes, however, by decreasing local officials’ enthusiasm and creativity. Coercing
local cadres into compliance could undermine innovation and flexibility, thus reducing
what has been one of the strongest catalysts for economic growth for the last three
decades.  How  effective  is  this  strategy,  and  what  reconfiguration  of  central-local
relations does it  entail? These are questions one wishes to see addressed in further
scholarship.
12 In any case, this book opens new venues for studies of central-local relations in China,
compiling arguments that used to be separated and offering a solid base on which to
draw further research. It should be a starting point for anyone seeking to understand
the consequences of decentralisation and re-centralisation in post-1978 China.
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